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We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and
strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in ﬁnitely repeated two-
player games with a Pareto-inefﬁcient Nash equilibrium. We ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcantly more
cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes.
The difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach stable
full cooperation, but mainly by differences in choices of pairs that do not succeed in reaching full
cooperation.
1. INTRODUCTION
An important theme in industrial organization is the incidence of tacit collusion. In his survey
of industrial organization experiments, Holt (1995) suggests that price-setting contexts are
more prone to collusion than quantity-setting contexts: “if tacit collusion causes prices to be
above non-cooperative levels in price-choice experiments, why do quantities tend to be above
non-cooperative Cournot levels (...)?” (p. 423). The if part has recently been corroborated by
experimental studies,1 but to our knowledge, no attempt has been made to shed more light on
the why part of Holt’s remark.
In this paper, we present results from a laboratory experiment suggesting that the difference
in collusion is related to the fact that choices in price-setting games are strategic complements,
whereas choices in quantity-setting games are strategic substitutes. The implemented games
are ﬁnitely repeated games with two players and a Pareto-inefﬁcient Nash equilibrium.
Whether choices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements depends on the
effect of a change in a player’s choice on the marginal payoff of another player. The
1. See Suetens and Potters (2007), which is based on the data contained in Altavilla, Luini and Sbriglia (2005),
Davis (2002), Fouraker and Siegel (1963), and Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2000).
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effect is negative in the case of strategic substitutes and positive in the case of strategic
complements.2
A straightforward but important implication of strategic complementarity is that a change
in one player’s choice gives the other player an incentive to move in the same direction,
whereas with strategic substitutability the incentive for the other player is to move in the
opposite direction. This implies that in the case of strategic complements a best-responding
player will partially follow a cooperative move made by another player. For example, in the
typical case of oligopolistic price competition with substitute goods (strategic complements),
if a ﬁrm that aims at colluding sets a price above the Nash equilibrium level, then the best
response for the competitor is to set a price above the Nash equilibrium level as well. In this
scenario, the average price will always be more collusive than the Nash equilibrium price. In
the typical case of quantity competition with substitute goods (strategic substitutes), however,
if a ﬁrm sets a (collusive) quantity below the Nash equilibrium level, then a best-responding
ﬁrm will set a quantity above the Nash equilibrium level. The average outcome will now, all
else equal, deviate to a lesser extent from the Nash prediction than in the case of strategic
complements.3 The theoretical work of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1991) that highlights how
aggregate outcomes are shaped by the interaction between the nature of strategic interaction
and heterogeneity of players is based on this intuition (see also Camerer and Fehr, 2006). They
show that, for the same distribution of cooperators and best-responders in a population, the
aggregate outcome will deviate more from the Nash equilibrium toward a cooperative outcome
under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitutability. This inspired us to expect
more cooperation (collusion) with strategic complements (price-setting) than with strategic
substitutes (quantity-setting).
In order to ensure a ceteris paribus comparison of behaviour in games of strategic substitutes
and games of strategic complements, in our experiment, we control for potential confounds in
existing price- and quantity-setting experiments. First, we use neutral labelling instead of price
or quantity labels because the latter two might trigger different behaviour. Framing effects
have been shown to be potentially important in several experiments and questionnaires (see,
e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Hoffman et al., 1994; Huck, Normann and Oechssler,
2004; Zhong, Loewenstein and Murnighan, 2007). Second, we control for the sign of the
externality by disentangling it from the “sign” of the strategic interaction.4 In price and quantity
games, both signs covary: quantities are strategic substitutes and generate a negative externality,
2. A game is characterized by strategic complements (substitutes) if ∀i,j and i  = j :
∂2πi
∂xi∂xj > 0(< 0), implying
that the best-response functions are upward- (downward-) sloping (see Topkis, 1978; Bulow, Geanakoplos and
Klemperer, 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984). Strategic complementarity or substitutability also have a bearing
on the learning dynamics in games (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991).
3. Furthermore, in a price-setting game the player making a cooperative deviation from the Nash equilibrium
will be better off relative to the Nash equilibrium if the other player best-responds to this deviation, whereas in a
quantity-setting game the player initiating a cooperative deviation will be worse off relative to the Nash equilibrium
if the other player best-responds. Based on this strategic effect of altruism, Bester and G¨ uth (1998) and Rotemberg
(1994) show that altruistic preferences may be beneﬁcial in material payoff terms in games with strategic complements,
but not so in games with strategic substitutes.
4. Games characterized by strategic substitutability or strategic complementarity have externalities by nature;
this (at least locally) follows from the fact that
∂2πi
∂xi∂xj
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while prices are strategic complements and generate a positive externality.5 Finally, and most
importantly, we impose the same standard theoretical benchmarks (Nash, cooperation and
corresponding payoffs) across strategic substitutes and complements treatments. The relative
position of the Nash equilibrium and the joint payoff maximum within the strategy space
differs substantially between price-choice and quantity-choice experiments, and so do the
corresponding payoffs. For example, under price competition the relative payoff gain when
moving from Nash equilibrium play to joint proﬁt, maximizing cooperation is usually larger
than under quantity competition.6
It is not only in industrial organization that the prevalence of cooperation may interact in
an important way with strategic complementarity or substitutability.7 Consider, for example, a
situation of team production, where members of a team decide how much effort to put into a
team task. This is an example where actions can be either strategic substitutes or complements
depending on whether the team members’ skills are substitutes or complements. Furthermore,
strategic complementarities are also present in environments such as arms races and conspicuous
consumption, while common-pool resource environments (public bads), strategic trade policy
and patent races tend to be characterized by strategic substitutability. Thus, there are many
environments for which a relation between the type of strategic interaction and the incidence
of cooperation may be relevant.
Our experiment is also related to the experimental literature on cooperation in (ﬁnitely)
repeated games with two players, such as prisoners’ dilemma games or trust games. In such
games, at least some players cooperate or learn to cooperate up until the ﬁnal rounds, where
cooperation breaks down (see Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006).
Kreps et al. (1982) rationalize this pattern of cooperation combined with “end-effects” by
introducing a small fraction of reciprocal types such that it may pay off for a rational player
to cooperate as well as long as the end of the game is not too close. Camerer and Weigelt
(1988) and Andreoni and Miller (1993) ﬁnd experimental support in favour of this model. Yet,
in this literature, no distinction is made between games of strategic complements and games
of strategic substitutes.8
Ours is not the ﬁrst experimental study to examine the relevance of strategic complemen-
tarity and substitutability for behaviour. Motivated by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989),
Fehr and Tyran (2008) examine the adjustment of prices after an economic shock. They ﬁnd
that this adjustment is slower if the game has strategic complementarities compared to the case
of strategic substitutability. An important difference with our study is that Fehr and Tyran focus
on the speed of convergence and do not address issues of cooperation. This is reﬂected in their
choice to implement games with a efﬁcient Nash equilibrium. Fehr and Tyran mention that they
5. There is literature that suggests that the sign of the externality may have an impact on cooperative play.
Andreoni (1995), Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1998), Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999), Park (2000), and
Zelmer (2003) ﬁnd more cooperation in positive externality games than in negative externality games, while Brewer
and Kramer (1986) ﬁnd an effect in the opposite direction.
6. Moreover, in most studies, both the equilibrium price and the equilibrium quantity are in the lower end of the
strategy space. To the extent that there is a random component to behaviour, this may induce relatively cooperative
(competitive) outcomes in price-choice (quantity-choice) games.
7. See Eaton (2004) for a discussion and typology of dilemma environments based on the sign of the externality
and the sign of strategic interaction.
8. Repeated games also allow for learning, e.g. to play the static Nash equilibrium. Such learning is typically
studied in repeated game experiments with more than two players (see, e.g., Rassenti et al., 2000; Offerman, Potters
and Sonnemans, 2002).
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want to rule out the possibility “that collusion slows down adjustment to the equilibrium”.9
Whether collusion (cooperation) occurs more frequently under strategic complementarity than
under strategic substitutability is precisely what we are interested in.
The experimental results conﬁrm our expectation that there is signiﬁcantly more cooper-
ation, on average, under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitutability. The
difference is to some extent driven by a difference in the speed with which some pairs reach
stable full cooperation, but mainly by differences in choices of pairs that do not succeed in
reaching full cooperation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the experimental




Since our aim is to examine whether the nature of strategic interdependence has an inﬂuence
on cooperation in dilemma games, we design strategic substitutes (SUBST) and strategic
complements (COMPL) treatments. In all treatments, ﬁxed pairs of subjects play a ﬁnite
repetition of the same stage game. We implement quadratic payoff functions and ensure that
the stage game has a unique and Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium and a symmetric socially
efﬁcient outcome. Games characterized by strategic substitutability or strategic complementarity
have externalities by nature. In the case of a negative externality the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-
dominated by lower actions and vice versa for games with a positive externality (see Eaton and
Eswaran, 2002). In our design, we deal with this potential confound by running SUBST and
COMPL treatments for both positive and negative externality cases. This gives the following
four treatments:
1. strategic substitutes
(a) negative externalities (SUBSTneg)
(b) positive externalities (SUBSTpos)
2. strategic complements
(a) negative externalities (COMPLneg)
(b) positive externalities (COMPLpos).
It is straightforward to show that transforming a symmetric game with a positive externality
into one with a negative externality can be done without changing incentives. Suppose that
the decision variable of player i in a positive externality game is represented by xi, with
xi ∈ [0,m]. The transformation of this game into one with a negative externality–without
changing incentives–is achieved by replacing the decision variable xi by m − yi for i = 1,2,
where yi is the decision variable of player i in the corresponding negative externality game.
The transformation is somewhat similar to the transformation of a public good into a public
bad game, or of a give-some into a take-some game (see, e.g. Andreoni, 1995; van Dijk and
Wilke, 2000).
For the comparison across treatments to be “clean”, we require that both theoretical
benchmarks–the Nash equilibrium and the joint payoff maximum (JPM)–are the same in
9. Chen and Gazzale (2004) examine the impact of the degree of strategic complementarity on the speed of
convergence to equilibrium. In their study, the equilibrium is also efﬁcient, and hence, cooperation is not an issue.
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the COMPL and SUBST treatments. We want to exclude the possibility that the mere location
of these benchmarks within the strategy space could cause any of the treatments to appear more
cooperative. For instance, if behaviour were random and uniform over the strategy space, then
all the treatments should look equally non-cooperative. Also, we want the payoff levels of the
two benchmarks to be the same across the treatments. Moreover, we impose the restriction that
the “optimal defection payoff”–that is, the best response to fully cooperative play by the other
player–is the same across the different treatments. This implies that an analysis on the scope
for cooperation in the spirit of Friedman (1971) gives the same outcome in all treatments. A
ﬁnal restriction is that the absolute values of the slopes of the (linear) best-response functions
are the same in the treatments. This ensures that best-reply dynamics generate the same speed
of convergence across SUBST and COMPL.10
In sum, our requirements for SUBST and COMPL consist of six common features: (1)
the same Nash equilibrium choice, (2) the same Nash equilibrium payoff, (3) the same
JPM choice (conditional on the sign of the externality), (4) the same JPM payoff, (5) the
same optimal defection payoff, and (6) the same best-response functions’ slopes (in absolute
values). Figure 1 visualizes requirements 1, 3 and 6. The Nash equilibrium is in the middle
of the strategy space in each of the treatments. The distance to the JPM point is the
same in all treatments. The (linear) best-response functions are equally “steep” across the
treatments.
We use quadratic payoff functions with six parameters for the stage games. This allows us
to impose the six requirements listed above. The payoff function of player i in a two-player
positive externality COMPL game is deﬁned as follows:
π
COMPLpos
i (xi,x j) = a + bxi + cxj − dx2
i + ex2
j + fx ixj, (1)
with b,c,d,f > 0, e ≥ 0, xi,x j ≥ 0, i,j = 1,2a n dj  = i. These restrictions are sufﬁcient
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2(d − e − f)
(3)
where d>e+ f for xJPM to be strictly positive.
In a SUBSTpos game, the payoff of player i is deﬁned as follows:
π
SUBSTpos
i (xi,x j) = α + βxi + γx j − δx2
i +  x2
j − ζxixj, (4)
10. While considerable behavioural evidence indicates that best-response dynamics are not often followed by
subjects, other adaptive learning rules, such as ﬁctitious play, are calculated from best responses. Since our games are
dominance-solvable, these adaptive learning mechanisms converge to the (unique) Nash equilibrium (Milgrom and
Roberts, 1991).

































Best-response functions, Nash and JPM choices
with β,γ,δ,ζ > 0,   ≥ 0, xi,x j ≥ 0, i,j = 1,2a n dj  = i. The game is one of strategic
substitutes and for the game to generate a positive externality, the condition γ + 2 xj − ζxi > 0
must be satisﬁed, which is the case for the parameterization we use in the experiment. The





and the joint payoff maximizing choice is equal to
xJPM =
β + γ
2(δ −   + ζ)
(6)
where δ> − ζ for xJPM to be strictly positive. For the JPM choice to be symmetric, the
condition δ> + ζ should hold.
As noticed previously, replacing the choice variable xi with m − yi transforms a positive
externality game into a negative externality game. After the transformation, the SUBSTneg
game would turn into a typical Cournot game by imposing the restrictions   = 0a n dγ = mζ.
For the Nash equilibria to be the same across positive and negative externality games, the Nash
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equilibrium must be in the middle of the choice set, such that m =
2b
2d − f
, and minimum and
maximum actions are the same across all treatments.
The six restrictions listed above impose six linearly independent restrictions that allow
unique identiﬁcation of the six parameters in the payoff functions. The six restrictions are
satisﬁed, if the parameters α,β,γ,δ,  and ζ are deﬁned in terms of a,b,c,d,e and f in the
following way:11
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨









d(2d − f) 2
(2d + f) 2
  = e +
2f 3
(2d + f) 2
ζ =
f(2d − f) 2
(2d + f) 2
. (7)
The parameters we used for the experiment are a =− 28,b= 5·474,c= 0·01,d=
0·278,e= 0·0055 and f = 0·165 (which gives m = 28). Table 1 provides an overview of
the main theoretical benchmarks in the four treatments for the parameter constellation used in
the experiment.12 The optimal defection choice corresponding to πdefect is 17·4( 1 0 ·6) in the
case of COMPL and a positive (negative) externality and 10·6( 1 7 ·4) in the case of SUBST
and a positive (negative) externality.
11. It can be shown that the so-called sucker payoff, i.e. the payoff of cooperating while the other player defects,
is smaller in COMPL than in SUBST if these requirements are met. In other words, it is worse to be cheated on
in COMPL than in SUBST in terms of payoff loss. From this perspective, one might hypothesize there to be less
cooperation in COMPL than in SUBST (cf. the cooperation index and index of conﬂict suggested by Rapoport and
Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1967, respectively).
12. In setting the absolute value of the reaction curve’s slope we are constrained by the requirement that yJPM ≥ 0.
Assume that c is very small such that it becomes negligible; c ≈ 0. In that case, the expression for yJPM ≥ 0 reduces to
yJPM =
b(2d − 4e − 3f)
2(d − e − f)(2d − f)
(8)
and the condition yJPM ≥ 0 reduces to 2d ≥ 4e + 3f since d>e+ f and 2d>f. If we also assume that e ≈ 0t h e
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and the absolute value of the slope will always be
strictly smaller than 1/3.
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TABLE 1
Theoretical benchmarks in the experiment
SUBST COMPL
SUBSTneg SUBSTpos COMPLneg COMPLpos
Choicemin 0·00 ·00 ·00 ·0
Choicemax 28·02 8 ·02 8 ·02 8 ·0
ChoiceNash 14·01 4 ·01 4 ·01 4 ·0
ChoiceJPM 2·52 5 ·52 ·52 5 ·5
πNash 27·71 27·71 27·71 27·71
πJPM 41·94 41·94 41·94 41·94
πdefect 60·14 60·14 60·14 60·14
Slope −0·30 −0·30 0·30 0·30
2.2. Procedure
Six computerized sessions were conducted in CentERlab at Tilburg University in November
2004 covering the four treatments.13 In each of the ﬁrst four sessions one of the four
treatments was run, and in the ﬁnal two sessions mixes of all treatments were run in order
to balance the number of observations across the four treatments. A total number of 110
students participated in the experiment. They were recruited through e-mail lists of students
interested in participating in experiments. Each treatment had 28 participants corresponding to
14 independent observations (pairs), except treatment SUBSTneg which had 26 participants or
13 independent observations.
All participants received the same instructions (see Appendix A). The treatments differed
only with respect to the payoff function. It was explained to the subjects that their earnings
depended on their own choices and on the choices of one other participant in the session,
which remained the same during the entire experiment. They were asked to choose a number
between 0·0 and 28·0 in each round.14 Subjects could calculate their earnings in points by
means of a payoff table for combinations of hypothetical choices that are multiples of two,
and by means of an earnings calculator on the computer screen for any combination of
hypothetical choices.15 They were explicitly told that choices were not restricted to be multiples
of two.
The same static game was repeated 31 times with the same pairs of players, including a
trial round which did not count to calculate earnings. After each round, subjects were informed
about the choice of the paired participant and their own and the matched player’s payoff.
Earnings were denoted in points and transferred to cash at a rate of 100 points = 1E U R .
Subjects were informed about the number of rounds. The sessions lasted between 50 and 55
minutes, and average earnings were 9·30 EUR.
13. We used the experimental software toolkit z-Tree to program the experiment (see Fischbacher, 1999).
14. The number of possible decimal points was limited to one.
15. Earnings in points were rounded at two decimals. Payoff tables are in Appendix A. In order to show the
difference in the best-response functions between strategic SUBST and COMPL, best responses for multiples of two
are marked in grey (which was not the case in the experiment).
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3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
3.1. Aggregate results
We present the data in terms of the degree of cooperation which is deﬁned as follows for pair
k in round t:
ρkt =
average choicekt − choiceNash
choiceJPM − choiceNash .
When the average choice of pair k in round t is the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, ρkt = 0
while ρkt = 1 at the JPM benchmark. When the average choice of the pair is between the
Nash and the JPM benchmark, 0 <ρ kt < 1. Average choices more competitive than the Nash
equilibrium imply that ρkt < 0. This transformation of choices is made in order to simplify
comparison across treatments and has no impact on any of our conclusions.16
A ﬁrst result is that the sign of the externality does not have an effect on the degree of
cooperation under either SUBST or COMPL. Averaged over the pairs and over the rounds,
the degree of cooperation is 0·24 in SUBSTneg as compared to 0·17 in SUBSTpos, and it is
0·49 in COMPLneg as compared to 0·42 in COMPLpos. These differences are not statistically
signiﬁcant.17 Therefore, in what follows we pool SUBSTneg and SUBSTpos into SUBST and
COMPLneg and COMPLpos into COMPL.
Our main experimental result is expressed in Figure 2, which depicts the evolution of the
average degree of cooperation in the SUBST and COMPL treatments. Clearly, the aggregate
data support the hypothesis that strategic complementarity facilitates cooperation compared to
strategic substitutability. Table 2 provides statistical details for all rounds combined (1–30),
and separately for the ﬁrst half (1–15), the second half (16–30) and the ﬁrst and ﬁnal rounds
of the experiment. The second and third columns give averages (and standard deviations) of
the degree of cooperation for SUBST and COMPL, respectively. The p-values in the 4th
column correspond to Mann-Whitney U test statistics of the null hypothesis that the degree
of cooperation is the same in SUBST and COMPL. H0 is overall rejected in favour of the
alternative hypothesis that the degree of cooperation is larger in COMPL than in SUBST,
except in the ﬁrst round.
Figure 2 also shows that end-game effects occurred in all treatments, which is common in
ﬁnitely repeated social dilemma games (see, e.g. Ledyard, 1995; Selten and Stoecker, 1986).
However, Table 2 shows that the end-game effect is signiﬁcantly stronger in SUBST than
in COMPL, which is most likely due to the difference in optimal defection choice between
SUBST and COMPL.
Furthermore, the error bars in Figure 2 display that between-pair variability does not seem
to decline in time, for SUBST or COMPL. No general convergence to the Nash equilibrium
of the stage game or any other outcome takes place.
It is interesting also to look at within-pair variability. Table 3 contains data on the absolute
difference between the choices of the two players within each pair, averaged over different sets
of rounds. The table shows that players’ choices are more coordinated in periods 16–30 than
in periods 1–15 (p<0·002 in a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test). Later, we will show that this is
mainly due to pairs who manage to reach full, stable cooperation. However, what stands out
most clearly in the table, is that within-pair differences are signiﬁcantly higher in SUBST than
16. Alternatively, the degree of cooperation could have been calculated in terms of the average realized payoffs:
(average payoffs–Nash payoffs)/(JPM payoffs–Nash payoffs). Doing so does not alter any of our conclusions.
17. Non-parametric test statistics for H0 : ρneg = ρpos are in Appendix B.
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Figure 2
Average degree of cooperation
TABLE 2
Treatment effect: SUBST versus COMPL
ρ (s.d.a)
SUBST COMPL p-valueb
Rounds 1–30 0·20 (0·41) 0·45 (0·38) 0·012
Rounds 1–15 0·13 (0·38) 0·40 (0·39) 0·006
Rounds 16–30 0·27 (0·54) 0·51 (0·40) 0·050
Round 1c 0·23 (0·57) 0·34 (0·46) 0·164
Round 30 −0·26 (0·35) 0·12 (0·18) 0·000
N2 7 2 8
a Standard deviation measures between-pair variability.
b H1 : ρSUBST < ρCOMPL (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test).
c Based on 54 + 56 independent observations.
in COMPL throughout. Overall, choices within pairs differ on average by 4·4 under SUBST
and by 1·6 under COMPL. This is in line with the fact that a combination of cooperative play
and best response gives a larger difference in choices under SUBST than under COMPL. We
come back to the idea of heterogeneous play below.
3.2. Endogenous strategic complementarity
As outlined in the Introduction, strategic complementarity gives a player an incentive to
follow behavioural changes (e.g. cooperative moves) of the other player, while strategic
substitutability gives a player an incentive to move in the opposite direction. Yet, these
behavioural patterns can only partly be recovered from the data. In fact, we ﬁnd that a
behavioural change by one player is, on average, followed by a move in the same direction
by the other player in both COMPL and SUBST. This implies that if a player moves towards
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TABLE 3
Within-pair variability: SUBST versus COMPL
abs(choice1-choice2)( s . d . a)
SUBST COMPL p-valueb
Rounds 1–30 4·4( 2 ·64) 1·6( 0 ·99) 0·000
Rounds 1–15 5·3( 3 ·03) 2·1( 1 ·31) 0·000
Rounds 16–30 3·5( 2 ·91) 1·1( 1 ·03) 0·000
Round 1c 5·3( 5 ·96) 3·9( 4 ·31) 0·391
Round 30 6·7( 4 ·55) 1·4( 1 ·85) 0·000
N2 7 2 8
a Standard deviation measures between-pair variability.
b H1 :S U B S T> COMPL (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test).
c Based on 54 + 56 independent observations.
TABLE 4
Regression results on changes in choices
β1 β2
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
All 0·14 0·006 0·17 0·003
JPM pairs 0·35 0·000 0·03 0·795
Non-JPM pairs 0·06 0·120 0·22 0·000
 choiceit = β0 + β1 choicejt−1 + β2COMPL choicejt−1 + uit.
Regressions include individual random effects.
Standard errors are robust to within-pair dependency.
Two-tailed p-values are reported.
(away from) the JPM choice, the other player also moves on average towards (away from)
the JPM choice, in SUBST as well as in COMPL. However, the extent to which such a
move is followed is signiﬁcantly greater in COMPL than in SUBST. For example, estimating
the model  choiceit = β0 + β1 choicejt−1 + β2COMPL choicejt−1 + uit yields ˆ β1 = 0·14
with p = 0·006 and ˆ β2 = 0·17 with p = 0·003 (see Table 4).18
This pattern can be explained well by the presence of reciprocal players, that is, players
who respond cooperatively to cooperative acts and non-cooperatively to non-cooperative acts.19
Since such players follow cooperative (and other) choices by others, their presence generates a
form of strategic complementarity. This endogenous strategic complementarity is strengthened
by the strategic complementarity embedded in the payoff structure of COMPL, while it is–at
least partially–compensated by the strategic substitutability inherent in SUBST.
18. COMPL is a treatment dummy variable.
19. There exists ample evidence for the presence of reciprocal players (see, for instance, Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Keser, 2000; Fischbacher, G¨ achter and Fehr, 2001).












































Error bars represent one−tailed confidence intervals.
Non-JPM pairs JPM pairs
Figure 3
Average degree of cooperation for non-JPM and JPM pairs
3.3. JPM versus non-JPM pairs
A closer look at the evolution of individual choices within pairs suggests that a different choice
pattern emerges between pairs that succeed and pairs that do not succeed in jointly maximizing
payoff (see Appendix C). An important behavioural similarity across all treatments is that when
choices of both subjects in a pair are at the JPM level in the same round, the choices remain
at this level until (almost) the end of the experiment. Out of the 55 pairs there are 24 of which
both subjects simultaneously make a choice at the JPM level in at least one round.20 Out of
these 24 pairs, 92% (22 pairs) keep making choices at the JPM level until the last but one,
two, three or four rounds of the experiment.21 The latter type of pair is much related to how
Selten and Stoecker (1986) deﬁne cooperative end-effect play. We refer to this type of pair as
a JPM pair. The rest of the pairs are classiﬁed as non-JPM pairs. There are 11 JPM pairs in
SUBST and 11 in COMPL covering 40% of all pairs.22
That behaviour of JPM and non-JPM pairs evolves differently is clearly illustrated in
Figure 3 and Tables 5 and 6. In the ﬁrst half of the experiment, JPM pairs cooperate
signiﬁcantly more in COMPL than in SUBST. This suggests that pairs succeed sooner in
coordinating on the JPM choice in COMPL than in SUBST, or that, in other words, strategic
complementarities tend to speed up the process of getting to full cooperation. Indeed, under
SUBST it takes, on average, 14 rounds to attain stable full cooperation, while under COMPL it
takes 7 rounds (p = 0·039 in a one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test). The difference in degree of
cooperation between SUBST and COMPL obviously disappears in the second half: once pairs
20. We say that the choice of a pair is at the JPM level if the choice of both subjects is in the interval [25,26]
in positive externality games and in the interval [2,3] in negative externality games. The exact JPM choices are 25·5
and 2·5, respectively, but using the afore-mentioned intervals is behaviourally better justiﬁed: subjects often round
their choice at an integer number.
21. End-effects covering three or four rounds are each observed for one pair.
22. Pairs 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 43, 46, 51 and 54 are classiﬁed as JPM
pairs. The graphs in Appendix C are a tool that helps to visualize the deﬁnition of JPM pairs.
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TABLE 5
Treatment effect for JPM pairs: SUBST versus COMPL
ρ (s.d.a)
SUBST COMPL p-valueb
Rounds 1–30 0·61 (0·27) 0·84 (0·13) 0·051
Rounds 1–15 0·38 (0·46) 0·75 (0·26) 0·045
Rounds 16–30 0·85 (0·15) 0·93 (0·06) 0·234
Round 1c 0·39 (0·65) 0·54 (0·49) 0·383
round 30 −0·05 (0·32) 0·23 (0·19) 0·007
N1 1 1 1
a Standard deviation measures between-pair variability.
b H1 : ρSUBST < ρCOMPL (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test).
c Based on 22 + 22 independent observations.
TABLE 6
Treatment effect for non-JPM pairs: SUBST versus COMPL
ρ (s.d.a)
SUBST COMPL p-valueb
Rounds 1–30 −0·08 (0·17) 0·20 (0·26) 0·001
Rounds 1–15 −0·03 (0·19) 0·17 (0·28) 0·024
Rounds 16–30 −0·13 (0·26) 0·24 (0·27) 0·000
Round 1c 0·12 (0·48) 0·22 (0·39) 0·182
Round 30 −0·40 (0·30) 0·04 (0·14) 0·000
N1 6 1 7
a Standard deviation measures between-pair variability.
b H1 : ρSUBST < ρCOMPL (one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test).
c Based on 32 + 34 independent observations.
succeed in coordinating on the JPM choice, behaviour also stabilizes in SUBST until the last
but few rounds.23 This also implies that, for JPM pairs, cooperative moves are, on average,
followed to the same extent under SUBST and COMPL (see Table 4).
For non-JPM pairs, we observe that the difference in degree of cooperation between COMPL
and SUBST is signiﬁcant, and increases throughout the experiment: in the ﬁr s th a l fi ti s0 ·20
(p = 0·024) and in the second half it is 0·37 (p = 0·000). The average choice in COMPL
slightly increases, while in SUBST it decreases. Furthermore, a cooperative move is, in this
case, on average, only followed with COMPL. This implies that the endogenous strategic
complementarity discussed in Section 3.2 was largely the consequence of behaviour of JPM
pairs (see Table 4): ˆ β1 = 0·06 with p = 0·120 and ˆ β2 = 0·22 with p = 0·000.
These observations are in line with the idea that heterogeneity of players causes differences
in aggregate outcomes between COMPL and SUBST. Our main result that the degree of
cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher under COMPL than under SUBST is driven by behaviour
of non-JPM pairs, and of JPM pairs before reaching stable cooperation (i.e. heterogeneous
23. The strong end-effect observed for JPM pairs suggests that cooperation of JPM pairs is, to a large extent,
strategic.
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behaviour). Once a pair reaches stable cooperation and both subjects simultaneously make
JPM choices (i.e. homogeneous behaviour), the degree of cooperation is equally high (close to
1) in SUBST as in COMPL.
The heterogeneity explanation is supported by results of simulations assuming two different
types of players: cooperative and non-cooperative players. A cooperative player is assumed to
always reciprocate full mutual cooperation and also tries to induce cooperation by playing
fully cooperatively with a certain probability. This probability is positively related to the
cooperativeness of the partner’s response to his own earlier full cooperation. Otherwise,
he punishes by playing a Cournot best-reply or by playing spitefully, each with a certain
probability. A non-cooperative player only plays Cournot best-reply or plays spitefully, again,
each with a certain probability.24 A JPM pair consists of two cooperative players and a non-
JPM pair can be either a combination of two non-cooperative players or of a cooperative and a
non-cooperative player. The simulations replicate the key features of the experimental data (see
Appendix D for more details). JPM pairs reach full cooperation more quickly under COMPL
than under SUBST and, before they reach it, play is more cooperative in the former than in
the latter case. For non-JPM pairs, play is more cooperative under COMPL than under SUBST
throughout. In both cases, the main mechanism behind the difference is that a best-response to
full cooperation is or looks more cooperative under COMPL than under SUBST.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In his survey on industrial organization experiments Holt suggests that experimentalists should
not only test theoretical predictions and document any deviations; they should also examine
possible causes: “There are many instances in which non-cooperative equilibria in the market
period games provide biased predictions, but I think that we should begin with these predictions
and, as experimentalists, try to explain the direction of the bias” (Holt, 1995, p. 423). This is
what our experiment aims to do. Starting from the observation that price-choice experiments
tend to be more collusive than quantity-choice experiments, we zoom in on one of the possible
reasons for this difference: whether choices are strategic complements or substitutes. To isolate
the effect of this factor, we control for potentially confounding factors: framing effects, the
sign of the externality, and the location and payoffs of various benchmark outcomes.
Our experiment shows that behaviour is more cooperative in games characterized by
strategic complements than in games characterized by strategic substitutes. The aggregate effect
is large and signiﬁcant. The average degree of cooperation–measured in terms of the relative
distance to the Nash equilibrium–is more than twice as large under complementarity than
under substitutability. The effect is not uniform across pairs, however (just as in, for instance,
Offerman, Potters and Sonnemans, 2002). About 40% of the pairs manage to reach full, stable
cooperation, and to do so takes longer under strategic substitutes than under complements.
The aggregate effect is mainly driven by the behaviour of the 60% non-cooperative pairs who
overall play more aggressively and whose choices are less coordinated under substitutes than
under complements.
These observations are in line with the ideas put forward by Haltiwanger and Waldman
(1991, 1993) that heterogeneity of players causes differences in aggregate outcomes between
complements and substitutes. Whereas Fehr and Tyran (2005, 2008) and Camerer and Fehr
(2006) argue that heterogeneous degrees of sophistication interact signiﬁcantly with the
24. A spiteful player maximizes the difference in payoffs. Including spiteful behaviour is not necessary in order
to generate differences in cooperation between COMPL and SUBST. However, it is one way to generate negative
degrees of cooperation, as observed for non-JPM pairs under SUBST (see Figure 3).
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type of strategic environment–the presence of less sophisticated players moves aggregate
outcomes further away from the equilibrium under complements than under substitutes–our
results suggest that this interaction also applies to heterogeneous degrees of cooperativeness.
Indeed, if two cooperative players are matched in a ﬁnitely repeated game, at some point
full cooperation is reached and, once reached, no difference in cooperation is left between
cases of substitutes and complements. However, if a cooperative player is matched with a
best-responding player, then the best-responding player will move in the same direction if
choices are strategic complements, and in the opposite direction if choices are substitutes.
As a consequence, aggregate outcomes tend to deviate more from the static Nash equilibrium
when choices are complements. This mechanism corresponds well with the observation that the
aggregate effect in our experiment is mainly driven by pairs who do not succeed in reaching full
cooperation–among those are the heterogeneous pairs–and to some extent by the cooperative
pairs before they attain full cooperation.
Understanding the incidence of cooperation is a topic of interest in several other domains
than price and quantity competition. Inter-ﬁrm cooperation is, for example, a key question
in the literature on R&D and technological spillovers (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin,
1988; Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992). R&D competition is characterized by strategic
complementarity when spillovers are high, and by strategic substitutability when spillovers
are low. Our results suggest that (all else equal) the former case will be more conducive
to cooperation than the latter. Another example is the voluntary provision of a public good.
Contributions to a public good are strategic complements if production of the public good is
characterized by increasing returns to scale, and strategic substitutes if production of the public
good is characterized by decreasing returns to scale. Our results suggest that contributions
to the public good will be higher when the production function has increasing returns to
scale. Due recognition of the underlying type of strategic interaction will contribute to a better
understanding of the prevalence of cooperation in any environment where the Nash equilibrium
is Pareto-dominated.
APPENDIX A. INSTRUCTIONS25
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make a number of
decisions. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. At the end of the
experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants. If something is not clear, please raise
your hand and one of us will help you.
Your earnings depend on your own decisions and on the decisions of one other participant. The identity of the
other participant will not be revealed. The other participant remains the same during the entire experiment and will
be referred to as “the other” in what follows.
The experiment consists of 30 periods. In each period you have to choose a number between 0·0 and 28·0. The
other also chooses a number between 0·0 and 28·0. Your earnings in points depend on your choice and the other’s
choice. The table attached to these instructions gives information about your earnings for some combinations of your
choice and the other’s choice. The other gets the same table.
You can calculate your and the other’s earnings in more detail (for choices that are not multiples of 2 for instance)
by using the EARNINGS CALCULATOR on your screen. By ﬁlling in a hypothetical value for your own choice and
a hypothetical value for the other’s choice you can calculate your and the other’s earnings for this combination of
choices.
You enter your decision under DECISION ENTRY by clicking on Enter.
In each period you have about 1 minute to enter your decision.
25. Note that in the payoff tables in the experiment the best-response curves were not marked in grey.
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The other’s choice → →
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0
0.0 41.27 36.50 31.91 27.50 23.27 19.22 15.36 11.68 8.18 4.87 1.73 −1.22 −3.99 −6.57 −8.98
2.0 46.88 41.91 37.13 32.52 28.10 23.86 19.81 15.93 12.24 8.73 5.40 2.26 −0.71 −3.49 −6.09
4.0 51.84 46.68 41.70 36.90 32.28 27.85 23.60 19.53 15.64 11.94 8.42 5.08 1.92 −1.05 −3.85
6.0 56.14 50.78 45.61 40.62 35.81 31.18 26.74 22.47 18.39 14.49 10.78 7.25 3.89 0.72 −2.26
8.0 59.79 54.24 48.87 43.68 38.68 33.86 29.22 24.76 20.49 16.40 12.49 8.76 5.21 1.85 −1.33
10.0 62.78 57.04 51.48 46.10 40.90 35.88 31.05 26.40 21.93 17.64 13.54 9.62 5.88 2.32 −1.06
12.0 65.12 59.18 53.43 47.85 42.46 37.25 32.22 27.38 22.72 18.24 13.94 9.82 5.89 2.14 −1.43
14.0 66.81 60.67 54.72 48.96 43.37 37.97 32.75 27.71 22.85 18.17 13.68 9.37 5.24 1.30 −2.46
16.0 67.84 61.51 55.37 49.41 43.63 38.03 32.61 27.38 22.33 17.46 12.77 8.27 3.95 −0.19 −4.15
18.0 68.22 61.70 55.36 49.20 43.23 37.43 31.83 26.40 21.15 16.09 11.21 6.51 2.00 −2.34 −6.49
20.0 67.94 61.23 54.69 48.34 42.17 36.19 30.38 24.76 19.32 14.07 8.99 4.10 −0.61 −5.14 −9.48
22.0 67.01 60.10 53.37 46.83 40.47 34.29 28.29 22.47 16.84 11.39 6.12 1.03 −3.87 −8.59 −13.13
24.0 65.43 58.32 51.40 44.66 38.11 31.73 25.54 19.53 13.70 8.06 2.59 −2.69 −7.78 −12.70 −17.43




28.0 60.29 52.80 45.49 38.37 31.42 24.66 18.08 11.68 5.47 −0.57 −6.42 −12.09 −17.57 −22.88 −28.00
Figure A1
Payoff table for SUBSTneg
The other’s choice → →
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0
0.0 −28.00 −22.88 −17.57 −12.09 −6.42 −0.57 5.47 11.68 18.08 24.66 31.42 38.37 45.49 52.80 60.29
2.0 −22.39 −17.46 −12.35 −7.06 −1.58 4.07 9.91 15.93 22.14 28.52 35.09 41.84 48.77 55.89 63.19
4.0  −17.43 −12.70 −7.78 −2.69 2.59 8.06 13.70 19.53 25.54 31.73 38.11 44.66 51.40 58.32 65.43
6.0 −13.13 −8.59 −3.87 1.03 6.12 11.39 16.84 22.47 28.29 34.29 40.47 46.83 53.37 60.10 67.01
8.0 −9.48 −5.14 −0.61 4.10 8.99 14.07 19.32 24.76 30.38 36.19 42.17 48.34 54.69 61.23 67.94
10.0 −6.49 −2.34 2.00 6.51 11.21 16.09 21.15 26.40 31.83 37.43 43.23 49.20 55.36 61.70 68.22
12.0 −4.15 −0.19 3.95 8.27 12.77 17.46 22.33 27.38 32.61 38.03 43.63 49.41 55.37 61.51 67.84
14.0 −2.46 1.30 5.24 9.37 13.68 18.17 22.85 27.71 32.75 37.97 43.37 48.96 54.72 60.67 66.81
16.0 −1.43 2.14 5.89 9.82 13.94 18.24 22.72 27.38 32.22 37.25 42.46 47.85 53.43 59.18 65.12
18.0 −1.06 2.32 5.88 9.62 13.54 17.64 21.93 26.40 31.05 35.88 40.90 46.10 51.48 57.04 62.78
20.0 −1.33 1.85 5.21 8.76 12.49 16.40 20.49 24.76 29.22 33.86 38.68 43.68 48.87 54.24 59.79
22.0 −2.26 0.72 3.89 7.25 10.78 14.49 18.39 22.47 26.74 31.18 35.81 40.62 45.61 50.78 56.14
24.0 −3.85 −1.05 1.92 5.08 8.42 11.94 15.64 19.53 23.60 27.85 32.28 36.90 41.70 46.68 51.84




28.0 −8.98 −6.57 −3.99 −1.22 1.73 4.87 8.18 11.68 15.36 19.22 23.27 27.50 31.91 36.50 41.27
Figure A2
Payoff table for SUBSTpos
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The other’s choice → →
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0
0.0 41.27 31.42 21.61 11.84 2.12 −7.56 −17.19 −26.78 −36.33 −45.83 −55.29 −64.70 −74.07 −83.40 −92.68
2.0 51.11 41.91 32.76 23.66 14.60 5.58 −3.40 −12.33 −21.21 −30.05 −38.85 −47.61 −56.32 −64.98 −73.60
4.0 58.72 50.19 41.70 33.25 24.85 16.49 8.18 −0.09 −8.32 −16.50 −24.64 −32.73 −40.78 −48.79 −56.75
6.0 64.11 56.23 48.40 40.62 32.88 25.18 17.52 9.91 2.35 −5.17 −12.65 −20.09 −27.48 −34.82 −42.12
8.0 67.27 60.06 52.89 45.76 38.68 31.64 24.65 17.70 10.79 3.93 −2.89 −9.66 −16.39 −23.08 −29.72
10.0 68.21 61.66 55.15 48.68 42.26 35.88 29.55 23.26 17.01 10.81 4.65 −1.46 −7.53 −13.56 −19.54
12.0 66.93 61.03 55.18 49.38 43.62 37.90 32.22 26.59 21.01 15.47 9.97 4.51 −0.90 −6.26 −11.58
14.0 63.42 58.19 53.00 47.85 42.75 37.69 32.68 27.71 22.78 17.90 13.06 8.27 3.52 −1.19 −5.85
16.0 57.69 53.11 48.58 44.10 39.66 35.26 30.90 26.59 22.33 18.11 13.93 9.79 5.70 1.66 −2.34
18.0 49.73 45.82 41.95 38.12 34.34 30.60 26.91 23.26 19.65 16.09 12.57 9.10 5.67 2.28 −1.06
20.0 39.55 36.30 33.09 29.92 26.80 23.72 20.69 17.70 14.75 11.85 8.99 6.18 3.41 0.68 −2.00
22.0 27.15 24.55 22.00 19.50 17.04 14.62 12.24 9.91 7.63 5.39 3.19 1.03 −1.08 −3.14 −5.16
24.0 12.52 10.59 8.70 6.85 5.05 3.29 1.58 −0.09 −1.72 −3.30 −4.84 −6.33 −7.78 −9.19 −10.55




28.0 −23.41 −24.02 −24.59 −25.12 −25.60 −26.04 −26.43 −26.78 −27.09 −27.35 −27.57 −27.74 −27.87 −27.96 −28.00
Figure A3
Payoff table for COMPLneg
The other’s choice       → →
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0 22.0 24.0 26.0 28.0
0.0 −28.00 −27.96 −27.87 −27.74 −27.57 −27.35 −27.09 −26.78 −26.43 −26.04 −25.60 −25.12 −24.59 −24.02 −23.41
2.0 −18.16 −17.46 −16.72 −15.93 −15.09 −14.21 −13.29 −12.33 −11.32 −10.26 −9.16 −8.02 −6.84 −5.61 −4.33
4.0 −10.55 −9.19 −7.78 −6.33 −4.84 −3.30 −1.72 −0.09 1.58 3.29 5.05 6.85 8.70 10.59 12.52
6.0 −5.16 −3.14 −1.08 1.03 3.19 5.39 7.63 9.91 12.24 14.62 17.04 19.50 22.00 24.55 27.15
8.0 −2.00 0.68 3.41 6.18 8.99 11.85 14.75 17.70 20.69 23.72 26.80 29.92 33.09 36.30 39.55
10.0 −1.06 2.28 5.67 9.10 12.57 16.09 19.65 23.26 26.91 30.60 34.34 38.12 41.95 45.82 49.73
12.0 −2.34 1.66 5.70 9.79 13.93 18.11 22.33 26.59 30.90 35.26 39.66 44.10 48.58 53.11 57.69
14.0 −5.85 −1.19 3.52 8.27 13.06 17.90 22.78 27.71  32.68 37.69 42.75 47.85 53.00 58.19 63.42
16.0 −11.58 −6.26 −0.90 4.51 9.97 15.47 21.01 26.59 32.22 37.90 43.62 49.38 55.18 61.03 66.93
18.0 −19.54 −13.56 −7.53 −1.46 4.65 10.81 17.01 23.26 29.55 35.88 42.26 48.68 55.15 61.66 68.21
20.0 −29.72 −23.08 −16.39 −9.66 −2.89 3.93 10.79 17.70 24.65 31.64 38.68 45.76 52.89 60.06 67.27
22.0 −42.12 −34.82 −27.48 −20.09 −12.65 −5.17 2.35 9.91 17.52 25.18 32.88 40.62 48.40 56.23 64.11
24.0 −56.75 −48.79 −40.78 −32.73 −24.64 −16.50 −8.32 −0.09 8.18 16.49 24.85 33.25 41.70 50.19 58.72




28.0 −92.68 −83.40 −74.07 −64.70 −55.29 −45.83 −36.33 −26.78 −17.19 −7.56 2.12 11.84 21.61 31.42 41.27
Figure A4
Payoff table for COMPLpos
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After each period you are informed about the other’s choice and your and the other’s earnings in that period.
A history of your and the other’s past choices and earnings is available at the bottom right of your computer screen.
The ﬁrst period is a trial period and does not count when calculating your earnings. Your total earnings in points
are the sum of your earnings in points over the 30 periods. Your earnings in points will be converted into EUR
according to the following rate: 100 points = 1E U R .
APPENDIX B. EXTERNALITY TREATMENT EFFECTS
TABLE B1
Externality treatment effects (Mann-Whitney U tests)
ρSUBST (s.d.) ρCOMPL (s.d.)
Negative Positive p-value Negative Positive p-value
Rounds 1–30 0·24 (0·42) 0·17 (0·41) 0·519 0·49 (0·42) 0·42 (0·36) 0·795
Rounds 1–15 0·22 (0·39) 0·06 (0·37) 0·128 0·45 (0·43) 0·34 (0·35) 0·511
Rounds 16–30 0·26 (0·53) 0·28 (0·56) 0·730 0·53 (0·43) 0·49 (0·39) 0·982
N 1 31 4 1 41 4
H1 : ρneg =ρpos (two-tailed).
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We use simulations to show that the interaction between two types of players (cooperative and non-cooperative
players) can replicate the key features of the experimental data before end-game effects set in. Non-cooperative
players are deﬁned to only play non-cooperatively. In each period they condition their choice on the partner’s previous
choice: they play a myopic best-reply with probability β and spitefully with probability 1 − β where spiteful play is
deﬁned as maximizing the difference in payoffs. Cooperative players are assumed to always reciprocate full mutual
cooperation and to try to induce it with some probability. More speciﬁcally, a cooperative player is deﬁned to play
fully cooperatively for sure in period t if in period t − 1 the pair reached full cooperation. Otherwise he plays fully
cooperatively with probability αt and non-cooperatively with probability 1 − αt. In order to add the intuition that
the probability of full cooperation depends on whether the partner has responded in a cooperative way to one’s
own induced cooperation, αt is history-dependent. That is, given one’s own (full) cooperation in period t − 2, we
assume that αt is the following positive function of the degree of cooperativeness of the partner in period t − 1:
αt = 1/(1 + e−k(yt−1−14)).I nt h eﬁrst two periods of play and in periods where one did not fully cooperate in period
t − 2, αt is thus constant and, say, equal to α. The non-cooperative play of a cooperative type is assumed to consist
of myopic best-reply with probability β(1 − αt) and spiteful play with probability (1 − β)(1 − αt).
We assume that the share of cooperative players is equal to p and the share of non-cooperative players is equal to
1 − p. We calibrate p by equalizing p2 to 40%, which is the percentage of JPM pairs observed in the experiment. This
implies that among the non-JPM pairs there are (1 − p)2 matches of two non-cooperative types as well as 2p(1 − p)
matches of a non-cooperative with a cooperative type. In the ﬁrst period, cooperative types play fully cooperatively
with probability α and otherwise randomize over the full action set. Non-cooperative types always randomize in the
ﬁrst period.
Figure D1 shows average degrees of cooperation for JPM and non-JPM pairs separately, each based on 1000
simulations with k = 0.5, α = 0·4a n dβ = 0·75.26 One can see that the simulations replicate the key features of
the experimental data. The matching of two cooperative types generates convergence to full cooperation, and before
26. An α = of 0·4 corresponds to the percentage of JPM choices of players in a JPM pair observed in the ﬁrst
round of the experiment.
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Simulated evolution of average degree of cooperation for non-JPM and JPM pairs
convergence is reached, the degree of cooperation is higher under COMPL than under SUBST. Moreover, with
COMPL convergence is faster than with SUBST. The main intuition is that a best-reply to full cooperation is more
cooperative in the former than in the latter case. This leads to a higher probability of another fully cooperative act
(αt), generating a higher speed of convergence. The difference between SUBST and COMPL for non-JPM pairs is
driven by cooperative types meeting non-cooperative types.
We should note that, ﬁrst, the presence of the spiteful component is not necessary to generate differences between
SUBST and COMPL. Its presence is only necessary to replicate negative degrees of cooperation observed for non-JPM
pairs in SUBST. That is, the larger β (and thus the smaller the probability of spiteful play), the lower the degree of
cooperation of non-JPM pairs and the lower the speed of convergence to full cooperation for JPM pairs. Second, the
differences are robust to changes in the baseline probability for a cooperative player to choose the JPM choice (α). The
lower α, the lower the speed of convergence. For a large α, however, the difference between SUBST and COMPL in
the speed of cooperation build-up of JPM pairs disappears. Third, the qualitative features of the simulation results are
robust to changes in k in αt = 1/(1 + e−k(yt−1−14)).Y e t ,a sk decreases, the difference in speed of cooperation build-
up of JPM pairs decreases and disappears for k = 0. Moreover, the logistic speciﬁcation is not crucial. A (piecewise)
linear speciﬁcation would generate qualitatively similar differences.
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